

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING:  
PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS REDEFINED**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Steven L. Bullimore  
United States Army

Professor Susan Merrill  
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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## **ABSTRACT**

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Steven L. Bullimore

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The National Security Strategy notes that weak states are vulnerable to terrorist networks and therefore pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. The U.S. policy of pre-emption to eliminate terrorist networks through traditional combat operations is a partial solution. As an integral part of the nation's overall security strategy, the follow through to stabilize and rebuild states emerging from conflict is a national security priority. The U.S. military has a major role in these post-conflict operations with a current doctrine that is less than adequate for the tasks at hand. This project will assess the military's tasks and proficiency in peace keeping and stability operations against the requirements determined through recent operations in Iraq. The project will redefine the U.S. military's tasks in peacekeeping and stability operations within a future framework of Joint Interagency Operations and the changing roles of the nation's civilian agencies.



## THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING: THE TASKS OF PEACE AND STABILITY OPERATIONS REDEFINED

On one hand, you have to shoot and kill somebody. On the other hand, you have to feed somebody. On the other hand, you have to build the economy, restructure the infrastructure, build the political system. And there's some poor lieutenant colonel, colonel, brigadier general down there, stuck in some province with all that saddled onto him, with NGOs and political wannabes running around, with factions and a culture he doesn't understand.<sup>1</sup>

- Gen. Zinni, 4 Sept 03

The National Security Strategy notes that weak states are more vulnerable to terrorist networks and that these weak states can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.<sup>2</sup> The U.S. policy of pre-emption to eliminate these terrorist networks, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, leaves the host state in a weakened condition and extremely vulnerable to insurgency and terrorism. As an integral part of our nation's overall security strategy, the follow through to stabilize and rebuild states emerging from conflict is now a national security priority.<sup>3</sup> Rebuilding states or nation-building is a controversial mission that because of confusion over responsibilities and our commitment to conduct these operations has limited the interagency investments needed to better perform the tasks. Confusing definitions, conflicting doctrine and institutional resistance in both the state and defense departments continue to hamstring efforts to improve and codify tasks and responsibilities for peacekeeping operations.<sup>4</sup> Lessons learned from recent nation-building efforts in Iraq clearly indicate that the military has a broader role in post-conflict operations.

While the United States has made major investments in the combat efficiency of its forces, there has been no comparable increase in the capacity of the U.S. armed forces to conduct post combat stabilization and reconstruction operations.<sup>5</sup> This mismatch in combat and post-combat capabilities exacerbates the problem of nation-building because after the conclusion of combat operations the military is left with primary responsibility without a clear idea of the doctrine or tasks required to conduct the mission. To address the military role in post-conflict operations one must answer two important questions. First, what tasks can and should be performed by the military? For example, does the military have a role in nation-building and more particularly, local governance? Finally, what adjustments to training and doctrine should be made in order for the U.S. military to better perform peacekeeping and stability missions in support of the greater goal of nation-building?<sup>6</sup>

The analysis that follows suggests that the military has a broader role in stabilizing and rebuilding a nation than currently articulated in service doctrine. The context for this argument is

an assessment and comparison of the military's doctrine and tasks versus, the policy and guidance provided by non-DOD stakeholders in peacekeeping operations. The assertion of a broader military role is supported by the demonstrated performance of and requirements placed on the military in recent operations in Iraq. This evidence warrants a refocusing of the military tasks associated with peace and civil-military operations and adjustments to military training and doctrine to better prepare the military for its' role in future nation-building efforts.

#### Current Situation

With regard to the United States interests, no one agency or group is alone in efforts to conduct nation-building or post conflict reconstruction. The Defense Department, State Department, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), International partners, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and various supporting contractors are potential stakeholders with the host nation in operations to rebuild a nation. The State Department's daily mission throughout the world is to provide expertise and counsel in presidential decisions on policy. The Department of Defense has robust assets and primacy for providing security and tends to be the work horse in post conflict situations. USAID is a major player in support of six critical sectors of democratic governance, education, health, economic growth, infrastructure, and humanitarian assistance.<sup>7</sup> International partners are extremely valuable to the endeavor for the experience, perspective and legitimacy that they bring to the mission. Contractors have become a common face in Peace and Reconstruction efforts throughout the world and provide a variety of services such as the technical assistance and training to local elected government officials provided by the Research Triangle Institute.<sup>8</sup>

The magnitude of nation-building tasks and the requirements to coordinate efforts with an extensive list of participants resulted in the creation of a new coordinator for reconstruction capable of directing the United States nation-building effort. National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) institutionalized the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the Department of State. While NSPD-44 empowers the Secretary of State to improve coordination, planning and implementation, the directive tasks the S/CRS to coordinate and lead integrated U.S. government reconstruction and stabilization efforts. When operations involve the military the directive calls on the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to integrate contingency plans.<sup>9</sup>

With a variety of participants from many different organizations and a history of no overarching guidance or control it is natural that there is an issue in defining the problem. Within the United States government there is no universal agreement on terms and definitions

applicable to the tasks referred to as nation-building. The lack of common definitions and terms leads to confusion over roles and responsibilities. Terms and their definitions present real roadblocks and misunderstandings between the multiple agencies attempting to coordinate efforts toward a common goal.

World War II post-conflict operations were known as “occupations” and many missions since have been termed “peacekeeping” or “peace enforcement”. The current U.S. administration has preferred to use the terms “stabilization and reconstruction” to refer to its post-conflict operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Analysts such as James Dobbins cloud the issue further by defining the term nation-building “as actions taken in the aftermath of a conflict to rebuild a nation and support an enduring peace” and place the military in a primary role for nation-building, though the term does not appear in military doctrine.<sup>10</sup> While the military does not use the term nation-building, tasks associated with this work are generally captured under the headings of peace operations, peace building, and civil-military operations. The military is often its own worst enemy when considering existing terms and definitions and doctrine is slow to catch up with the current language. Former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft states generally, nation-building is currently recognized inside the Pentagon as “stabilization and reconstruction” (S&R) activities.<sup>11</sup>

There are many questions raised in the debate over U.S. involvement in international peacekeeping and the first tend to be the basic questions of definition. Institutions outside the Department of Defense (DoD) struggle with the military term “peacekeeping” and how it relates to “stabilization,” “peace enforcement,” “reconstruction” and “nation-building”?<sup>12</sup> Military definitions currently fail to encompass the breath of S&R operations, particularly nation state building. While the military struggles with terms to describe tasks associated with post-conflict efforts the problem is compounded by terms and definitions commonly used outside DoD.

Explanations and definitions from the civilian sector shed some light on what the military tasks essentially entail and suggest a broader realm in which work is required. It is the broadness of the endeavor and the variables of each post- conflict situation that present a semantic dilemma: no single term currently in use can accurately capture the broad and ambiguous nature of all these types of operations.<sup>13</sup> Emerging actors such as the S/CRS are working to define terms and reach an acceptable definition for all key stakeholders. The S/CRS defines stabilization “as the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a break-down in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful longer-term development.” The Office also defines reconstruction as “the process of rebuilding the political, socio-economic, and physical

infrastructure of a country or territory where it has been damaged or destroyed to create the foundation for longer term development.”<sup>14</sup>

It is in the reconstruction phase, such as rebuilding political and socio-economic infrastructure, which the military struggles across the unfamiliar ground of governance and capacity building. The magnitude of recent operations have exposed the military to a list of relevant terms that before were resident primarily in the State Department and USAID lexicon. According to the Decentralization and Democratic Local Governance Programming Handbook, “Decentralized democratic government, local governance and capacity building” are essential terms and tasks in Stability and Reconstruction efforts.<sup>15</sup>

Doctrinal issues revolve around the basic question of what is the post conflict phase and what is its purpose? On the military side, current joint doctrine recognizes that although coercive military operations may end, the conflict may continue under other means.<sup>16</sup> This implies that there may not be a clean break between the fighting and the rebuilding. S&R operations are resident in Phase IV of military operations and are best described as transition operations, because military forces position the Area of Operations to facilitate a move back to peace and civilian government control.<sup>17</sup> The doctrine of transition operations by definition indicate that the military is focused on handing over responsibility versus conducting the operations.

Essentially the Defense Department and most civilian agencies see Phase IV operations as containing three phases. The civilian policy, however, is more descriptive and prescriptive in laying out a focus for operations. The military’s Joint Publication 3-07.3 articulates peace building operation phases as: Emergency, Stabilization, and Normalization. It also states that these phases may not be sequential and can occur simultaneously in various parts of the country, depending on local circumstances.<sup>18</sup> Similarly, the civilian framework is organized as “initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability.” This framework is further characterized by suggesting the requirements within the three phases. The initial response often includes military intervention for basic security, stability, and emergency services. The second phase, transformation, focuses on developing legitimate and sustainable indigenous capacity, often with special attention to restarting the economy, establishing mechanisms for governance and participation and securing a foundation of justice and reconciliation. The final phase, fostering sustainability, consolidates long-term recovery efforts, often leading to the withdrawal of all or most of the military.<sup>19</sup>

Specific descriptions in military doctrine highlight general considerations for transitioning to civilian authority and address specific types of forces required to conduct post-conflict operations. With the exception of Civil Affairs manuals, military doctrine does not adequately

address or prioritize post-conflict tasks for the bulk of the military force. For example, Joint doctrine states that harmonization across all agencies and at all levels is essential to Civil-Military Operation (CMO) efforts and that empowerment of civilian agencies leading to a transition of responsibility and ultimate extraction of the military force is a key principle.<sup>20</sup> Further, the stated objectives of CMO are to enhance military effectiveness and reduce the negative impact of military operations on civilians. This doctrine implies that the main focus is to hand over responsibility for stability operations to civilian agencies and extract the military force as quickly as possible and that CMO are always supporting a larger military mission and is not the primary focus of operations.<sup>21</sup>

The military has special troops to perform CMO. Civil Affairs soldiers are trained to perform a variety of supporting tasks to include assisting in reestablishing a civil government.<sup>22</sup> In fact, the Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) is the only force structure requisite in DOD specifically designed to support the mission of civil administration.<sup>23</sup> A weakness in military doctrine and structure is that Civil Affairs troops are limited in number and not robust enough for a large nation-building effort. In recent operations, it is often not specialized civil affairs personnel who conduct governance operations, but tactical combat personnel in the theater.<sup>24</sup> These tactical troops receive little training to conduct CMO operations, aside from the traditional security tasks. Nadia Schadlow notes that the military has never relished the tasks associated with governance. Military leaders have always been resistant to any task that diverts combat power away from the combat mission. Yet despite these reservations, the military often has sought control over “governance operations” due to military necessity and the desire to preserve unity of command.<sup>25</sup>

Overlapping roles and nebulous responsibilities generally define the conditions under which the military pursues its version of nation-building. The lack of clarity in definitions and doctrine exacerbates the determination of roles and responsibilities for various actors. Without firm governing doctrine supported by technical capability, the military can find itself tasked to perform missions it is not trained for, but assigned to because it seems to be the best choice at the time. In reference to recent S&R operations it was reported to Congress that the military was called upon to perform the missions not only for its extensive resources but also because no other U.S. government agency could match the military’s superior planning and organizational capabilities.<sup>26</sup> Current doctrine states that because of the disruption that accompanies war, the military may have to assume the lead during the emergency phase of stability operations to prevent loss of life or the destruction of essential infrastructure.<sup>27</sup> Recently issued DoD Directive 3000.05 commits DoD to supporting S&R efforts as a core military mission to be given

priority comparable to combat operations.<sup>28</sup> Military doctrine firmly supports the force capabilities and role expectations in recognizing that the ultimate measure of success is political. Commanders must seek a clear understanding of the political objectives and how military operations support these broader objectives.<sup>29</sup> A key consideration for the military supporting post-conflict S&R tasks is that the military effort is only one part of the complex nation-building endeavor.

Because no other agency or organization can provide the robust security required for post-conflict operations, all military forces have key roles in supporting peace building. There are, however, service capabilities that provide special advice, assistance, coordination and functional expertise. These capacities and resources are resident in US Army Civil Affairs, USMC Civil Affairs Groups, USAF support to civil affairs, Engineering, Health Service Support, Military Police, Security Police Forces, Psychological Operations, Religious Ministry Support, Transportation, and US Coast Guard.<sup>30</sup> While robust and diverse, many of these service capabilities and specialties are employed in support of the military force in theater and thus their capacity is quickly exceeded when supporting both the military and the reconstruction missions. Critics, largely from the civilian sector, point out that although individual military personnel may have relevant expertise, “the military’s comparative advantage is not in service delivery and capacity building.”<sup>31</sup> These two issues are basic to the USAID whose mandate deals with the public services and capacity building facets of S&R operations. Emerging military doctrine recognizes that “civil agencies have the lead and should be responsible for the economic and developmental assistance, the political negotiations, the fiscal support, the social programs and the policy support.”<sup>32</sup>

The debate and criticism over which agency does what facet of the operation best indicates that all are required to adequately perform the complex mission of rebuilding nations after conflict. Because service and capacity building usually begin while security operations are underway and continue after it concludes, the military and civil efforts are inextricably linked and harmony and synchronization are imperative.<sup>33</sup> Operations over the last four years have forced the continued development of the military’s stabilization operations platform and the increasing frequency of civil-military collaboration during these operations implies that this convergence of effort is here to stay.<sup>34</sup> Nadia Schadlow, a senior program officer in the International Security and Foreign Policy Program of the Smith Richardson Foundation, defines governance operations as political and economic reconstruction and states the greatest issue facing military and political leaders may be the need to distinguish between governance operations, which are

a core element of all wars, and activities such as peace operations and peacekeeping that may occur independently of war.<sup>35</sup>

If S&R is assumed to be a joint civil-military operation, then it is necessary to examine the tasks articulated in doctrine to determine the essential tasks the military can and should perform in support of the joint effort. A key initial consideration or task essential during the planning phase of Phase IV operations involves establishing clear policies for civil-military interaction regarding relief and development initiatives.<sup>36</sup> Detailed planning addresses the specifics of how the joint agency team will execute the three phases of S&R operations and who is responsible for particular tasks.

Within military doctrine, the Universal Joint Task List addresses a variety of potential military requirements relevant to S&R type operations. Most significant among these tasks is the security required to support a program of internal defense and development essential to addressing economic, social, informational and political needs.<sup>37</sup> Military assistance is often necessary in order to provide the secure environment for these efforts to become effective. Virtually all doctrine agrees that the military, because of its robust war fighting capability and equipment, will always have the primary responsibility for establishing and maintaining public order and security in a post- combat setting.<sup>38</sup> The overall security environment is the biggest factor in determining the scope of military involvement beyond executing security tasks. As such, the military recognizes that its main efforts are conducted in the Emergency Phase of stability operations. Security conditions early in the Emergency Phase of the operation may warrant that critical and immediate tasks normally accomplished by civilian organizations may temporarily exceed their capabilities and that the military should perform those tasks or cooperate with the civilian organizations to ensure that the tasks are accomplished.<sup>39</sup> The S/CRS mandate agrees, “In immediate post-conflict situations, or extremely dangerous environments, military forces may be the only personnel available to perform such tasks.”<sup>40</sup> With short term military responsibility agreed upon, what are those tasks the military must be able to perform?

In terms of governance, the military may be required to provide short-term support to an established government or interim government sponsored by the UN or other international body. The main goal for the military is to create an environment conducive to stable governance.<sup>41</sup> Further stated, the need to establish a secure environment, ensure the survival of the population and maintain a minimum level of economic activity in a region may require that military units participate in public service tasks during the emergency phase of the operation until such time that NGO, IO and host nation capacity is established.<sup>42</sup> Joint Doctrine and Tasks are not

relevant to local governance as they do not extend to the tactical level, forcing the services to employ basic civil affairs doctrine without specific training and employ acquired Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) to execute this mission.<sup>43</sup>

The S/CRS is fairly specific in addressing tasks they believe the military may have a capacity to accomplish.

As most often used when referring to the U.S. military, nation-building refers to a range of activities to include repair, maintenance or construction of economic infrastructure such as roads, schools, electrical grids, and heavy industrial facilities and of health infrastructure, water and sewage facilities. They can also include training and assistance to police, the military, the judiciary, and prison officials as well as other civil administrators.<sup>44</sup>

Recent operations demonstrate the military has the expertise, capability and willingness to conduct the training required to rebuild the police and military. It is also capable of assisting and advising the medical, judiciary and prison officials in reestablishing basic functions. Operations also demonstrate that the large scale repair, maintenance and construction are largely beyond the capabilities of the military. Basic repair of roads and services are conducted out of necessity, when related to military requirements and then only at great expense of resources. The military can facilitate, focus efforts and provide the security necessary for contractors and private businesses to conduct the maintenance and construction of other economic infrastructure. Because of the military's organizational efficiency and planning capability, the military can also assist in restoring some of the normal administrative functions such as organizing elections, and creating new or reconfigured government departments.<sup>45</sup>

#### Case Study: Iraq

To illustrate the issues identified in the previous section the recent U.S. experience in Iraq will serve as an example of a stabilization and reconstruction mission. In April 2003, the U.S.-led Coalition Forces took control of Iraq and the military's tasks shifted from combat to postwar security, peacekeeping, and reconstruction. Instead of being able to hand over reconstruction tasks relatively quickly to civilian agencies, contractors and Iraqi counterparts as planned, the military became engaged in peacekeeping and nation-building.<sup>46</sup>

In the three years following the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent declaration of the end to major combat operations, the United States continues to grapple with the tasks of rebuilding Iraq. During this period, significant lessons have been learned and adjustments made in operating procedures. Key lesson areas include; the need for a closer relationship between civilian and military leadership on the same mission, the need for a detailed post-conflict reconstruction plan prior to commencing operations, the requirement for additional resources to

provide for and transition security and the necessity to expand the role of the military in local governance and capacity building.

The requirements for close cooperation with civilian leadership and detailed post-conflict planning were closely intertwined issues as post-conflict operations began. The post-conflict operation in Iraq represented a new approach to nation-building by bringing military and civilian efforts together under one unitary command.<sup>47</sup> Unfortunately, this new construct was severely challenged from the beginning by the lack of detailed Phase IV planning which resulted in multiple changes of course early in the mission. The Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) had civilian lead during the planning phase, but was quickly relieved of the mission and replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)<sup>48</sup>. While this move confirmed the lack of a viable plan for post-conflict reconstruction, the situation was further complicated by the normal rotation of personnel among both the civilian and military organizations. The problem was compounded again when the CPA was dissolved and the Department of State took over responsibility for the civilian sector.<sup>49</sup> The multiple transitions or “Relief in place” in military terminology, violated service doctrine to complete transition and termination planning as soon as possible during the initial phase of the mission.<sup>50</sup> The failure to adequately plan post-conflict operations negatively impacted the coalition’s ability to influence events in the critical first weeks of the emergency phase of Stability Operations and continued to sow the seeds of confusion through to the hand over of political control to the Iraqi National Government.

Aside from limiting transitions, a viable civil-military plan must accurately assess the conditions under which operations will commence and account for variables in those conditions. The plan must describe the end state in sufficient detail for all agencies to develop supporting plans.<sup>51</sup> Beyond the traditional security tasks articulated in doctrine, the military was unprepared for the scope of the missions assigned during Phase IV. The rapid shift from combat operations and the ill defined tasks of Phase IV reconstruction resulted in a groping shift of priorities for the U.S. military. Though the military possessed years of experience in the Balkans, where it developed a concept of Effects Based Operations (EBO), it was slow to implement this concept in Iraq. The military remained focused far too long on lethal or “kinetic” operations to fight an insurgency that grew in response to the violence. By eventually focusing efforts on EBO the military has implemented what civilian policy implies, that better security is achieved when all lines of operations move forward together. There are times when the military must accept the preeminence of non-lethal effects.<sup>52</sup>

The speed at which the American military dismantled the Iraqi armed forces, publicly termed “shock and awe”, led to great expectations among the Iraqis that the Americans would

just as rapidly reconstruct Iraq. When this did not materialize and the military appeared to do nothing to stop the situation from getting worse, many Iraqis began to wonder just what their future entailed. Initial failures of security in Iraq, stemming from a force undermanned to support S&R operations across the entire country, led to a lack of confidence in the American occupation. Failure to stop looting had long term consequences.<sup>53</sup>

The military quickly found that the security task included far more than conducting combat patrols and raids to eliminate insurgent influence. The military's personnel shortage worsened when the State Department struggled to recruit sufficient numbers of international civilian police to deploy to Iraq in an oversight and training capacity to work with the Iraqi police. In the absence of an interim security force, the military had to fill the gap.<sup>54</sup> In addition to a vast security mission, the military began the tasks of recruiting, training and equipping both the Iraqi police and military forces. Due to the security situation, low ratios of troops to tasks in Iraq continued to have a severe impact on the U.S. Army's ability to support essential reconstruction functions. Saddled with recruiting, training and mentoring the new Iraqi Army, local American commanders found training and operations with Iraqi police forces to be overwhelming. Further requirements to escort and secure Civil Affairs teams, military lawyers and Civil engineers forced balancing and compromises between security and governance tasks.<sup>55</sup> Winning the peace has proven far more manpower intensive than winning the war.

Security aside, military forces found themselves involved with tasks normally relegated to the civilian sector. A lack of capacity forced the CPA to depend on military commanders in the field to undertake civil reconstruction efforts. While the military commanders were reported to initially have done an excellent job, "they were at the edge of what they were trained to do and were not entirely comfortable with complex governance, economic, and social tasks."<sup>56</sup> A major miscalculation on the part of the military was in forgetting that combat operations and governance operations are integral to war and occur in tandem. Nadia Schadlow states, "US soldiers in Iraq today are wondering why, if the war is supposed to be over, we are still being shot at. They remain in Iraq because the war is not over."<sup>57</sup> One of the major goals in invading Iraq was to execute a regime change, implying that the war is not over until the regime has been changed. Removing Saddam Hussein from power was the first part of this mission, efforts to leave Iraq with a new regime continues. "The situation in Iraq today reinforces this link between combat and reconstruction – not as separate phases of war, but as interrelated components."<sup>58</sup> As a result, the daily engagements for commanders at the local level revolved around security and governance. Training, certifying and operating with Iraqi Army and police forces represented the security focus, while regular meetings and planning with Sheiks, Imams,

Mayors, Governors, and their councils highlighted the governance focus.<sup>59</sup> The security situation and lack of U.S. civilian capacity to provide personnel to the local levels has forced military leadership to deal with governance at the tactical level.

The military found themselves immersed in governance issues related to the composition, authorities and procedures for local council selections, establishing structure to new democratic functions and facilitating the first nation wide election. Governance experts such as Larry Diamond recognize that it may be desirable to conduct early elections at the local level to facilitate the emergence of leaders and political parties.<sup>60</sup> In concert with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), who initially established a transitional administration by "handpicking" representatives at the national level, the military conducted a selection process at the local level to establish provincial and city councils.<sup>61</sup> Two issues emerged from this effort. First, handpicking or selecting leaders by the military severely undercut the legitimacy of the process in the eyes of the Iraqis. Second, while the military is cited for doing an excellent job of creating the local political councils, the lack of planning hampered efforts to quickly link the local councils to the Iraqi Government Council.<sup>62</sup> The key lesson in the establishment of the structure of the new government in Iraq was that the efforts of the military were required and that in the absence of the security environment necessary for a robust civilian effort, the military must be prepared to establish local governance structures.

The second lesson for the military working local governance tasks was the criticality of facilitating the building of governance capacity. Though not a doctrinal military task, the military is criticized for not putting "effort into building the capacities of the local service directorates so that these service directorates could deliver services to citizens on their own."<sup>63</sup> Civilian governance doctrine articulates that resources must reach the people in the society. Empowering local coalition staffs, working with local Iraqi governments would have employed large numbers of Iraqis and visibly repaired damaged infrastructure.<sup>64</sup> The military belatedly learned that well directed and prioritized capital projects are essential in providing jobs and a visible sign of local improvement.<sup>65</sup>

Not all issues associated with capacity were a result of a failure to plan or specific technical expertise. The United States was unable to rapidly employ the \$18.4 billion earmarked for reconstruction efforts in Iraq and security issues were cited as one of the main reasons for the slow disbursement.<sup>66</sup> Military commanders responded by initiating the Commanders Emergency Resource Program (CERP) to address distribution problems, but rules and regulations governing CERP were too restrictive to allow a rapid response for commanders at the local level.<sup>67</sup> The implication is that in some security situations it may be warranted to

empower the military for a greater role in distributing and managing reconstruction funds in the emergency phase of S&R operations.

#### Recommendations

While the military has a tremendous capability to accomplish many of the tasks required for effective S&R operations, adjustments must be made in four key areas. The military must accept a role in governance, train for it and when necessary accept a major responsibility for implementing the associated tasks. The military should design support troop structure to expand the capacity to perform S&R operations. The military must routinely work and plan in concert with civilian organizations and get comfortable in doing so. The military should train all leaders in tasks previously associated exclusively with Civil Affairs units. A more detailed discussion of recommendations follows.

First, assign governance related tasks to the military and increase its capability to perform this task. The United States learned from post-conflict operations in Germany and Japan the importance of immersing the military in the occupied nation's domestic society. As a result, combat troops learned to rapidly transition to a governance focus.<sup>68</sup> The large numbers of personnel required for security and scope of the mission indicate that the military is essential to the local governance task and possesses a tremendous capacity that civilian agencies may initially lack. It is essential that the military accept the role in local governance and expand capabilities to do so effectively. Efforts must doctrinally link the local governance mission with civilian efforts above the local level. A military role in governance operations requires adjustments in military definitions and doctrine to bring them in line with civilian agency policies. Existing doctrine and the concepts that shape combat service support, counterinsurgency operations, special operations, and civil affairs mission need to be modified.<sup>69</sup> The military must recognize the significance of building capacity to establish good governance, and it must push down to local commanders, greater authority for contracting and distribution of resources. Projects and initiatives must show immediate results to effectively establish the legitimacy of the local government. Visible, fast-yielding and prioritized investments in the community are essential in the early stages of the reconstruction process.<sup>70</sup>

Second, maintain a balance in the composition of the military so that it can adequately perform assigned stabilization and reconstruction tasks. The United States' ability to conduct S&R operations is significantly dependent on the size and composition of the military. For example, recent cuts in the support force to facilitate the fielding of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) can directly undermine the ability to perform S&R operations.<sup>71</sup> Much of the military's

S&R operations capability is resident in the services of support troops who are hard pressed in some instances to support the combat forces as designed. Sufficient numbers of support troops must be retained to provide the degree of redundancy required to provide a credible S&R capacity. These support forces are essential to effectively train and develop a police force, oversee and provide technical advice on reconstruction contracts and advise local commanders on a wide variety of civil issues dealing with governance and capacity building.

Third, establish a structure and means for routine coordination with other government agencies and expand civil-military collaboration efforts to include IGO and NGOs. The formation of the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG), assigned at the Combatant Command level, is a first great step for the military and development communities achieve a better understanding of each other's comparative advantages and collaborate accordingly.<sup>72</sup> This collaborative structure facilitates post-conflict contingency planning concurrent with the development of combat operations plans. This concept must be further expanded to provide a collaborative capability below the combatant command level. Experience in Desert Storm, Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate that decisive operations designed to rapidly defeat an enemy no longer provide the luxury of engaging in combat operations without significant effort toward Phase IV planning.<sup>73</sup> Beyond the other USG federal agencies, it is essential that the military establish long term relationships and collaboration with a variety of international and non-governmental organizations to better understand their skills, knowledge and capabilities before embarking on a mission.<sup>74</sup>

Fourth, to improve capacity to carry out S&R activities, the military must address and adjust institutional training, doctrinal definitions and operations readiness. Contrary to the downsizing of institutional training in the last decade, extend S&R training to all military leaders and provide a more robust civil affairs base to their training. "PME institutions should incorporate more courses and lectures on stabilization and reconstruction operations, civil-military cooperation, interagency planning, media relations, and negotiations."<sup>75</sup> In concert with the S/CRS, the military should establish one set of terms with definitions that mean the same to all agencies and are conducive to collaborative operations. Finally, S&R tasks should be added to military units Mission Essential Task List (METL) to enable the military and its civilian leadership to measure and monitor readiness of unit capability to accomplish post-conflict tasks. Nina Serafino, of the Congressional Research Service, states "those who believe that peacekeeping and related operations are significant missions and important to U.S. national security have argued that readiness standards should also measure, or otherwise account for, performance of peacekeeping tasks."<sup>76</sup>

### Conclusion

Stability and Reconstruction or nation-building operations are likely the most difficult and resource intensive challenges facing the United States government in the next decade. Though the particular situation and details of each operation vary, the military routinely finds itself involved in some capacity. Recent and ongoing military transformation efforts focus on increased speed and lethality in executing combat operations. Early in this transformation process, the military demonstrated its capabilities with its amazing success in quickly crushing the Iraqi Army. Hans Binnendijk, of the National Defense University, argues “it is precisely the success of the U.S. military in transforming its forces to execute rapid decisive operations that makes it imperative to transform how it prepares for and executes stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations.”<sup>77</sup>

For a variety of reasons, the United States has participated in at least one new nation-building commitment every other year since the end of the Cold War. According to Francis Fukuyama, “we have been in denial about it, but we are in this business for the long haul. We’d better get used to it, and learn how to do it – because there will almost certainly be a next time.”<sup>78</sup> The U.S. military must leverage its current transformation effort to make post combat stabilization and reconstruction capability comparable to current combat efficiency.

### Endnotes

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